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good rule. Certainly the past decisions of some courts would still
be good law under this rule. This is illustrated by the enjoining
of strikes in two hospitals on the grounds that such strikes were
contrary to the best interests of the general public.
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Both statutory law and judicial decisions discriminate arbi-
trarily against a large group of Americans by excluding them from
labor legislation and enacting statutes limiting their rights and
privileges. It is clear that there should be an extension of the
definition of public interest to include employees of private in-
dustry where cessation of work results in great harm to the public
interest. Strikes should be banned when the public interest is
harmed whether the strike be by private or public employees. It
is important that public employees have the right to strike when
the public interest is not harmed and when the government is en-
gaged in proprietary and not sovereign activities.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
TORTS - INTERPRETATION AND OPERATION OF COLO-
RADO'S GUEST STATUTE CLARIFIED IN SEVERAL RE-
CENT CASES-The latest, and perhaps the most important, of
the recent guest statute cases is PettingelU v. Moede.1 In this case
the plaintiff's injury resulted from an automobile accident which
occurred when the defendant driver, who was inexperienced in
mountain driving, applied his brakes and' slid off of an icy high-
way on a mountain pass. He had been warned to put on chains,
but had not done so as there were "winter" tires on the jeep that
he was driving. The plaintiff, who was a guest and the only pas-
senger, had made no protest on the defendant's driving. There
were only minor variations in the testimony, and the case was
submitted to a jury which returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The
defendant appealed from the judgment entered on this verdict, and
the Supreme Court reversed with directions to dismiss the action.
The Court states that recent presentations made to it have
revealed that there is still a good deal of uncertainty and confusion
as to the provisions of our guest statute.2 The statute specifies
three instances where the driver of a vehicle may be liable to his
guest. Neither intentional accident nor intoxication are here in-
volved, so if there is a liability, it has to be on "negligence con-
sisting of a wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of others."
Admitting that it has previously been said that this phrase is self-
evident,3 the Court undertakes to clarify the interpretation of it.
Society of N. Y. Hospital v. Hanson, 59 N. Y. S. (2d) 91 (1945); Jewish
Hospital of Brooklyn v. Doe, 252 App. Div. 581.
I- Colo. -, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 15, p. 358.
2'35 C. S. A., c. 16, §371.
'Foster v. Redding, 97 Colo. 4, 45 P. (2d) 940 (1935).
DICTA
July, 1954
The Court defines negligence as "failure to exercise for the
protection of others that degree of care and caution that would,
under the prevailing circumstances, be exercised by an ordinarily
prudent person." Continuing, the Court says:
For the purpose of properly construing this statute,
ordinary or simple negligence should be considered as re-
sulting from a passive mind, while a wilful and wanton
disregard expresses the thought . . . of an active and
purposeful intent. Wilful action means voluntary . . .
Wantonness signifies . . . that it is wholly disregardful
of the rights, feelings and safety of others . . . To be
'wilful and wanton' there must be some affirmative act
purposefully committed which the actor must have real-
ized as dangerous, done heedlessly and recklessly, without
regard to consequences, or of the rights and safety of
others . . . The demarcation between ordinary negligence,
and wilful and wanton disregard, is that in the latter the
actor was fully aware of the danger and should have
realized its probable consequences, yet deliberately avoided
all precaution to prevent disaster. A failure to act in
prevention of accident is but simple negligence; a men-
tally active restraint from such action is wilful. Omitting
to weigh consequences is simple negligence; refusing to
weigh them is wilful. Performance of a dangerous act
wilfully, under certain circumstances, . .. is permissible,
and will not subject the actor to liability even under the
guest statute; . . .to be actionable under that statute the
conduct of the driver of the vehicle must be both wilful
and wanton, because a wanton act is never excusable.
A number of Colorado cases are cited as being in conformity with
this.
4
The Court next considers an instruction which tells the jury
that it may take into consideration whether the defendant, from
the surrounding circumstances and existing conditions, "should
have known that to continue his course of conduct would naturally
and probably result in injury." Should have known has appeared
in previous cases,5 but it was there never approved by itself and
it has to be taken together with the complete instructions in those
cases. The meaning of those instructions is that the jury can
find from the surrounding circumstances and facts an inference
that the defendant did in fact know of the danger. This is the
same as the method by which intent is determined. Further, the
Court feels that it is possible, under the instructions given in this
case, that the jury might have based liability on the basis of simple
Millington v. Hiedloff, 96 Colo. 581, 45 P. (2d) 937 (1935); Pupke v. Pupke,
102 Colo. 337, 79 P. (2d) 290 (1938); Bashor v. Bashor, 103 Colo. 232, 85 P.
(2d) 732 (1938); Helgoth v. Foxhoven, 125 Colo. 446, 244 P. (2d) 886 (1952).
Clark v. Small, 80 Colo. 227, 250 P. 385 (1926); Clark v. Hicks, 127 Colo.
25, 252 P. (2d) 1067 (1953).
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negligence alone; it is of course improper to speculate that a jury
selected a correct theory and disregarded a wrong one.
Once it has been established that a plaintiff is a guest, he
then has the burden of proving one of the situations for a recovery
under the statute. Reviewing the evidence in this case, the Court
holds that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff has not sustained this
burden. "If it appears clear that the law is such that the evidence
presented is insufficient, it is the duty of the court to direct a
verdict; if, on the other hand, the evidence is such that reasonable
minds might draw different conclusions therefrom, it is proper
that a jury decide the issue." Accordingly this case was reversed
for dismissal with one dissent on the issue of submission of this
particular case to a jury determination.
Another recent guest statute case is Lewis v. Oliver 6 in which
a judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff is reversed for a new
trial. The court states that there is merit in eight of the specifi-
cations of error but discusses only the misconduct of counsel
(statements made in front of the jury) and the giving of an in-
struction on simple negligence. While in the Pettingell case the
giving of such an instruction is unnecessary and confusing, in
this case it says that it is reversible error under the circumstances.
While the word "negligence" is used in the statute, it is well es-
tablished that each of the three elements that allow recovery by
a guest are something more and beyond negligence as it is ordin-
arily understood. An instruction on simple negligence has no
place in an action under the guest statute.
A third recent guest statute case is Loeffler v. Crandall 7 in
which a directed verdict for the defendant is affirmed. This case
holds, as do the others, that simple negligence will not sustain a
recovery when it has been established that the plaintiff was a
guest. Here it was properly held by the trial court that, as a
matter of law, the plaintiff did not sustain the necessary proof.
The case has an additional element in that it was contended that
the guest statute is not applicable as the plaintiff had agreed to
pay a share of the expense. The Court quotes from a California
case , and follows the rule that a tangible benefit to the driver must
be the motivating influence in furnishing the transportation to
take the passenger out of the guest statuteY Where the main pur-
pose of the trip is joint pleasure, an incidental agreement for
sharing the expense does not overcome the statute.
It is not felt that these cases make any radical changes in the
law of this state; rather it is felt that for the most part they
reiterate existing rules. They do, however, expand on them, and it
is believed that the clarification, which is the announced intention
- Colo.-, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 15, p. 356.
'- Colo. -, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 14, p. 319.
Druzanich v. Criley, 19 Cal. (2d) 439, 107 P. (2d) 445 (1940).
9 cf. Klatka v. Barber, 124 Colo. 588, 239 P. (2d) 607 (1951).
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of the Pettingell opinion, should be achieved to a considerable
extent.
T. H. CHRYSLER.
REAL PROPERTY-SAND AND GRAVEL ARE NOT MIN-
ERALS-In the case of Farrell v. Sayre,1 the action was brought
in the form of a request for a declaratory judgment to adjudicate
the rights of the respective parties in regard to certain sand and
gravel located on the plaintiff's property situated in Gilpin County.
The sand and gravel in question cover the entire surface of the
plaintiff's property. It was the contention of the defendant, Sayre,
that the sand and gravel were included in a mineral reservation
which he held in the plaintiff's land. The reservation was in the
following general terms:
. . and excepting and reserving all mineral and mineral
rights and rights to enter upon the surface of the land
and extract the same . . .
Prior to the commencement of this action the plaintiff and
defendant had entered into an agreement whereby the defendant
purported to lease his interest in the sand and gravel to the plain-
tiff in return for the payment of certain royalties for any gravel
removed. Apparently the trial court felt that this purported lease,
rather than the original reservation, was sufficient evidence of the
intention of the parties to support a finding that the mineral
reservation did in fact include the sand and gravel. That is, be-
cause the plaintiff entered into this agreement with the defendant,
his act amounted to a recognition of the defendant's rights in the
sand and gravel.
The Supreme Court in reversing the decision of the trial
court announced the rule to be followed in Colorado in this type
of situation as follows:
The mineral reservation here involved is in general
terms and does not expressly include sand and gravel.
It seems to be the general rule that where the surface of
the land is sand and gravel, a straight mineral reserva-
tion does not include the sand and gravel, and where a
similar situation has arisen, the cases turn upon the in-
tent of the paties at the time of the execution of the deed
containing the reservation, when such reservation is in
general terms, and virtually every decision is to the effect
that where the grant in the deed, as here, is nothing but
sand and gravel, it surely was not contemplated that the
parties intended to nullify the grant without some direct
specification in the reservation.
The Supreme Court cites the case of Waring v. Foden 2 as
controlling authority for the following principles: (1) That the
I- Colo. -, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 14, p. 312.
286 A. L, R. 969, 1 Ch. 276 (1932).
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word "minerals" when found in a reservation clause includes those
substances which are exceptional in use, value, and character (2)
That in determining whether a certain substance is exceptional you
must look to the meaning of the word in the vernacular of the
mining world, the commercial world, and whether or not the
parties considered it a mineral at the time of their agreement.
The decision seems a proper one in view of the fact that if
the reservation had included the sand and gravel, which admittedly
covered the entire surface of the land, then all that the plaintiff
had obtained by his deed was a layer of sub soil below the sand and
gravel with an implied easement to use the surface layer which
was the property of the defendant. It is clear that the general
terms in which the reservation was couched does not warrant
such a result without clear evidence of a contrary intent. This
position is further strengthened by the fact that it was admitted
that the defendant, Sayre, had no knowledge that the sand and
gravel had commercial value and that he did not contemplate any
use of it at the time the reservation was made.
The decision illustrates that the word "mineral" is not sub-
ject to exact definition but rather is susceptible to limitation or
expansion according to the intention of the parties and the cir-
cumstances surrounding its use. The effect of the decision would
appear to be that if a grantor intends to reserve sand and gravel
covering the surface of the land he will have to make a specific
reservation to that effect.
CLYDE J. COOPER, JR.
REAL PROPERTY-AN ADVERSE CLAIM MUST BE
HOSTILE AT ITS INCEPTION OR THE CLAIMANT MUST
SET UP TITLE IN HIMSELF BY SOME CLEAR, POSITIVE
AND UNEQUIVOCAL ACT.-In the case of Lovejoy v. School
District No. 46 of the County of Sedgwick and State of Colorado I
the School District claimed that it was the owner in fee simple
of certain land and that it was deprived of lawful possession
thereof on or about August 1, 1952, by the defendants, Ben and
Phyllis Lovejoy. It appears that School District No. 68 comprised
a large area of sparsely settled land, and in order to provide ac-
commodations for children of the District, three separate schools
were established known as North 68, Middle 68 and South 68.
The School in question is South 68. No evidence was submitted
whatever on the question of the manner and conditions under
which the District was allowed to enter the land in 1866; however,
in 1908 the State issued its patent to the land to Bessie and Frank
W. Sherman and that patent contained no reservations or ex-
ceptions. Numerous conveyances of the property were had there-
after from 1900 to March 2, 1951, when the defendants, Lovejoy,
acquired title by deed; none of the conveyances of the land, with one
negligible exception, contained reservations or exceptions. In
I - Colo. -, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 13, p. 285.
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District No. 46.
In reversing the District Court which held for the plaintiff,
the Supreme Court said:
The very essence of adverse possession is that the
possession must be hostile not only against the true
owner, but against the world as well. An adverse claim
must be hostile at its inception, because, if the original
entry is not opexiy hostile or adverse, it does not become
so, and the statute does not begin to run as against a
rightful owner until the adverse claimant disavows the
idea of holding for, or in subservience to another, it ac-
tually sets up an exclusive right in himself by some clear,
positive and unequivocal act. The character of the pos-
session must become hostile in order that it may be
deemed to be adverse. And this hostility must continue
for the full statutory period. 1 Am. Jur., p. 871, Sec. 137.
The statute begins to run at the time the possession of the
claimant becomes adverse to that of the owner, and this
occurs when the claimant sets up title in himself by some
clear, positive and unequivocal act.
No one representing School District No. 68 ever as-
serted that the District owned the land until immediately
before the commencement of this action. The District,
without color of title to possession, had to be in possession
under an open and notorious claim of ownership. Under
the circumstances here, mere occupancy was not sufficient
to put any of the true owners on notice that the District
claimed the land ...
It appears that by this case Colorado follows the rule that
where one is claiming title to land by adverse possession without
color of title the claim must be hostile at its inception or if not
then it must later become hostile to the true owner's interests. In
this case the land appears to have been public domain before 1908
when the state issued its patent; therefore the District, itself a
governmental organization, could not have made a claim adverse
to the state, for this would have been tantamount to asserting an
adverse claim against itself. Therefore, any time after 1908 the
District could have by an affirmative act put the true owners of the
land on notice. This never occurred and it appears that mere pos-
session of the land was not enough to put the owners on notice
that the land was claimed by the District.
It is clear that by this holding if the owner acquiesed in the
mere occupancy of the land the adverse claimant would be pre-
cluded from acquiring title. It seems logical to assume that if the
true owner and the claimant both thought that the land involved
belonged to the latter, the statute 2 would not begin to run be-
2 '35 C. S. A., c. 40, §136.
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cause, although this might not amount to acquiesence, no act by the
claimant would have put the owner on notice. Therefore, when
the original entry is not adverse to the interests of the true owner
in Colorado there must be a later act done by the claimant which
would put the owner on notice and this act must be "clear, posi-
tive, and unequivocal" before the statute would begin to run-
even though the claimant had been in exclusive possession of the
land for more than the statutory period.
JOHN BROOKS, JR.
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Dear Subscriber:
It becomes my extreme pleasure
at this time to announce the comple-
tion of a 30-year subject-author in-
dex to DICTA.
It is the sincere hope of the stu-
dents of the University of Denver
College of Law who have effected
the compilation, and of those mem-
bers of the Bar who helped with use-
ful suggestions, that this publication
will become an asset to you in your
use of DICTA.
A self-addressed card for your
convenience in subscribing to the
index, is being forwarded to you in
the near future. A prompt reply will
greatly help us in determining the
number of copies to print.
Sincerly yours,
DWIGHT A. HAMILTON
Managing Editor
College of Law
DICTA
